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THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE MOVEMENT, 1977-1979

WILLIAM P. BROWNE AND JOHN DINSE

Beginning in late 1977, the media, television
in particular, portrayed as a unique cultural
phenomenon an emerging American Agriculture Movement (AAM), a pending farm strike,
and a depressed farm economy that had
caused this mobilization. Much was indeed
unique, especially to the individual farmers
and the specific manner in which they were
attempting to apply political pressures, but the
American Agriculture Movement itself was
similar to other organizational attempts that
have taken place in rural America.
In the following paper we chronicle the
emergence of the American Agriculture
Movement as a distinct entity, identify the
common features in the emergence of new
farm organizations, and examine the conditions of modern society and technology that
affect group formation.

AN ORGANIZATION DEVELOPS

Despite impressions left from journal and
media accounts that portrayed a grass roots
insurgency, the emergence of AAM must be
seen in terms of an active leadership directing
organizing efforts to a relatively inactive constituency.l These leaders encouraged activism
through a concerted strategy of mobilization
with an emphasis on the national issue of a
farm strike, the reintroduction of a traditional
farm movement ideology, and the skillful use
of public relations. 2
AAM began in mid-summer· 1977 in
Campo, Colorado, as an outgrowth of those
enduring cafe conversations typical in all farm
communities. However, Bud Bitner, George
Bitner, Alvin Jenkins, Darrel Schroeder, Gene
Schroeder, Van Stafford, and a few regular
listeners talked mostly about a new political
spokesman for farm interests during this
particular summer. 3 They saw a gloomy farm
economy beset by both low prices and high
costs, by an unresponsive government, and by
an array of farm interest groups who were out
of touch with real farm needs. Their immediate reaction to the 1977 Farm Bill, a piece of
legislation that confirmed incentives for large-
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scale production without high supports, intensified their frustrations about each of these
conditions and precipitated a decision to
protest. Encouraged by the reception their
ideas found in their own community, these
locally respected larger-scale farmers and farmrelated businessmen proceeded to develop an
organization based on rallies and protests
against the political system. 4
They would prompt and assist farmers
throughout the country to organize as local
groups, much along the lines of Farm Bureau
county chapters, but without Bureau-related
emphasis on nonpolitical services. AAM locals
would be pockets of farmer interaction and
discussion that would inspire political activism
instead of emphasizing individual income. S
The local organizations would Jom in
statewide and, finally, national demonstrations of movement support. Farmers, the
initial organizers believed, were widely concerned about their weakened economic status
but politically lethargic because they lacked
inspired leadership.
To organize and inspire, the six instigators
called a meeting of local farmers for 6 September 1977. They were to form the core for an
ever broadening series of similar gatherings.
Approximately 140 residents attended that
first rally and were presented the already
constructed outline for a national farm strike
of all food and fiber producers. This strike was
to boycott the sale of all farm commodities
until federal law backtracked from the last two
omnibus farm bills and guaranteed one hundred percent parity in prices. The participants,
who now had enthusiastic leaders along with a
strategy and a goal, then were asked to provide
the manpower to stage a larger meeting in the
county seat at Springfield to draw up strike
plans. For this they were allowed only one
week in order to reinforce the urgency of
economic conditions and to create organizational momentum for the American Agricultural
Strike, as the group was called at first.
The massive use of flyers, personal calls to
potentially sympathetic friends, and appeals
for media coverage brought out an estimated

seven hundred farmers in Springfield. All
areas of Colorado and neighboring states,
primarily Kansas and Texas, were represented
at the meeting. Participants were asked to
observe how quickly a large and supportive
turnout could be gathered. This demonstrated, the speakers argued, that farmers were
angry enough, smart enough, and committed
enough to matter politically. The Campo
leaders then gained acceptance of a 14 December target date for withholding to begin. In
addition, the leadership gained approval-as
well as money and volunteer staff assistancefor establishing a national farm strike headquarters in Springfield. Approximately two
thousand protestors from both east and west
coasts, along with U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland, turned up for national
television network coverage of the next rally,
in Pueblo, Colorado, two weeks later. 6
The strike movement took two distinct
organizational directions, one decentralized
and the other centralized. The nationwide
system of locals was modeled on the successful
Campo/Springfield rallies. The original organizers encouraged local pockets of activism
where strike enthusiasm and peer pressure
could encourage turnout. With limited resources gathered from participants and from
sympathetic bankers and business people and
with a three month deadline, AAM hit the
roadways and airways. Volunteers at headquarters, who were usually the original founders, identified supportive acquaintances and
set up meetings and rallies in as many states as
possible. In other states, organizers went in
blind and used local media coverage to encourage attendance.
By October, AAM strategy was to establish
local offices, protests, and rallies, and to
develop state organizations from the helter
skelter of locals. The organizers communicated
continuously with the locals as it became
apparent that energetic supporters looked
beyond themselves for direction, information,
and motivation. As communications vehicles,
the state organizations were seen as newly vital
cogs in the plan. The state organizations also
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worked to establish locals. For example, cashcrop farmers in central Michigan coordinated
state level operations and traveled north to
dairy country, east to the state's richest
croplands, and west to the fruit and vegetable
producing regions. While neither headquarters
nor state efforts always paid off in new locals,
there were high rates of success. Within three
and one-half months of the Springfield meeting, AAM, according to its leaders, had
opened eleven hundred local offices and had
forty states represented at a national prestrike
meeting.
The second direction taken by AAM in its
organizing after the Springfield rally was
toward centralization of planning, with part of
the emphasis going toward a culminating
protest in Washington that would bring a
nationwide focus to the organization and the
strike. Organizers originally believed that
fragmented local farm interests could result in
no common purpose. Organizing experiences
and the development of state units reinforced
this belief in the need for a strong headquarters role in creating both consensus and
common activities.
This leadership role was unlike that of
traditional farm interest groups with their
designated organizational hierarchies, specialized staff assignments, lobbyist-directed grass
roots activism, chains of command, and governing rules. 7 From the beginning, AAM
eschewed membership dues, rolls, officers, and
any rules. To enhance supporter participation,
and to more directly contrast AAM with
general farm and commodity groups criticized
by the organizers as no longer representative of
farmers, the movement insisted that anyone
and everyone could speak on its behalf as long
as they supported the general ideals of the
group.
Within this context, AAM leaders still
developed a highly centralized organization
with most responsibilities in the hands of the
founders. The Springfield headquarters efficiently processed paperwork, monitored assignments, kept track of organizers and locals,
and ensured daily routing operations. In

addition, a functional-if not formal-division
of labor emerged within the first days of
operation. Volunteer staffing, recruitment,
fund raising, political liaison, economic analysis, public relations, and publications each
were carefully coordinated by an undesignated
management team composed mostly of the
original organizers.
Building a centralized movement was different from building locals that focused only
on the strategy of getting people together.
Because farm interests have remained economically diverse in terms of region, products, and
scale of production, headquarters committed
its efforts toward maintaining supporters'
involvement and creating an image of unity
among its followers. 8 Thus, organizers in
Springfield considered what to tell participating farmers, what indirect messages were
needed to encourage nonparticipating farmers,
how to transmit and reinforce these messages,
and how to identify inexpensive secondary
resources.
Several features came early to characterize
AAM and distinctively marked its operation.
The initial emphasis on one hundred percent
parity developed into AAM's only articulated
goal. Parity was demanded for all domestically
used or consumed agricultural products and
also for all foreign exports. In addition, parity
was demanded as the basis for all contracting
of products for national and international
reserves. Marketing of American agricultural
products also was to be guaranteed at one
hundred percent parity, with farmer input in
the marketing structure. Finally, meat and
livestock imports were to be banned until
parity was reached. 9 These specific but broad
agricultural goals enabled all AAM spokesmen
to direct their public remarks to common
rather than individual or specific commodity
interests. Second, in order to explain the
emphasis on parity and to present further a
view of integrated farm interests, AAM organizers drew upon a recurring theme of farm
protests and reconstructed an agrarian ideology reflective of historic demands for "a larger
share of the market value of " farm products. 1O
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Leaders argued that the threat of farmer
activism and a strike would force policymakers
to act positively because agriculture, especially
the family farm, was the critical link in the
national economy. AAM argued that the
economy could not withstand a farm action
but that economic conditions for farmers had
only reached this depressed point because
most policymakers and the public had been
kept ignorant of farm needs. Such a situation
allowed the enemies of family farming to create
structural conditions that would eventually
lead to large diversified corporate agriculture. ll
This argument-as a side benefit-also stressed
the AAM gospel of hope, that organizing in
protest and not the proposed strike itself
would turn the opinions of the public and
policymakers around. 12
With this simple set of goals and reinforcing ideology in place, AAM was able to
construct its remaining strategic features. Continued cultivation of the media became the
most important of these. The media was the
most direct way to let the uninformed public
and the as yet unactivated farmer become
aware of AAM's effort. It was also a quick and·
inexpensive means of communication for a
group strapped for both time and money. In
the fall of 1977 and well into 1978, AAM
leaders had only to keep the media informed of
planned events to secure coverage whenever
they wanted. Perceptions of uniqueness
brought reporters and cameras out from local
and national sources. Local coverage afforded
advertising for organizing and protest activities, enhancing turnout. National coverage
provided far more, showing AAM and its issue
of hard times as having gained at least some
temporary legitimacy since farmers from all
sections of the country were portrayed as
commonly bonded in protest.
The remaining central features were largely
stylistic. These included the virtually patentable AAM rally, the rousing speakers, the
publicity-oriented tractorcade, proliferating
pamphlets, and continued use of peer pressure
to generate turnout. All these tactics were
promoted by headquarters through the state

organizations and to the locals as the appropriate format for AAM activism. According to
the leadership, these had maximum shock
value and added greatly to the national and
consensual image that they desired.
As can be seen in almost every newspaper's
coverage, a standard AAM protest emerged.
Visible local activity began with Springfield-style mass meetings. Experienced organizers and a few local farmers did most of the
early talking, hoping to encourage the loudest
discussion possible from the floor. Then a
flamboyant or beguiling outside speaker, usually advertised as a long-time critic of farm or
business policy, launched into a rather ideological diatribeY The rally led to phase two, a
caravan of tractors and trucks scheduled to
parade through the business district at a peak
shopping period. Both the rally and tractorcade were accompanied by mass distribution of relatively short pamphlets on AAM, its
goals, and ideological justification. A final
ingredient was the coterie of broad-shouldered
and heavy-set farmers, strategically placed at
visible locations. Their purpose was to encourage the involvement of others in the ongoing
activity, to pass attendance sheets, and to
recruit for future AAM activities. In a more
general sense, as one organizer acknowledged,
such a farmer's purpose was "to intimidate, to
serve as a slightly ominous figure."'4 The
combined effect was one designed to demonstrate anger, activism, purposeful resolve, and
an implied threat of disruption and perhaps
even violence if cooperation was not forthcoming. AAM used these features of the organization to create an image that in turn was used to
gain the attention necessary for getting its
message across.
The image, the need for attention, and the
belief that the message would eventually work
all assumed more importance after the strike
deadline when the passing of legislation, as
well as the mobilization of farmers, became an
AAM purpose. AAM organizers had been
careful to note at the onset that three levels of
increasingly costly participation were implied
in their plans: turning out for a rally, working
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to promote the group and traveling on its
behalf, and, finally, not planting cropS.IS To
their credit, they realized that fewer and fewer
participants would continue their support as
their costs of involvement escalated. This
provided AAM resiliency and encouragement
to continue as its efforts were thwarted in the
early months of 1978. But this also made it
difficult for AAM to maintain any long-term
credibility.
AAM leaders soon became discouraged on
two fronts: in Washington, where their legislative goals were long debated but finally
failed, and in rural America, where all but a
handful of fields were planted during the
strike. In Washington, AAM's largest rally on
18 January turned out nearly three thousand
farmers and brought a long tractorcade into
town on the interstates. Official Washington
opened up its arms as these farmer lobbyists
spoke of the more than three million who had
attended AAM rallies. 16 Secretary Bergland
received AAM's statement of demands enroute in Omaha, and every congressional
office was filled with courteous but angry
protestors attempting to explain their position.
Many of these farmers, perhaps a third, stayed
throughout the spring as Congress found its
house hoppers filled with AAM inspired
proposals. Another hundred or so made plans
to stay or to arrange periodic returns through
the year to help support this seeming cornucopia of Washingtonian goodwill. As one of
these participants remarked enthusiastically,
"They poured out of every corner to meet with
us-when I sawall that, I knew we were
damned important." A fellow protest leader
said, "We thought we owned the damned
town, we knew it, by God. We knew we did."17
From January through April, these impressions seemed accurate. In addition to introducing the legislative proposals, the House of
Representatives in February held Agriculture
subcommittee hearings and, for two weeks,
included AAM. Congress, over the next few
months, continued to deliberate and eventually went on to pass a new farm loan program
and to call a moratorium on all Farmers Home

Administration foreclosures. Both actions occurred in a year when no major items were on
the agricultural agenda. Even more visible to
the protestors, however, were the twenty or
more legislators who left Washington and
returned to their districts to ride in the
unabating local tractorcades. But the triumph
was short-lived as symbolic acts of support
gave way to political realities.
The greatest frustration for the amateur
lobbyists of AAM resulted from their greatest
legislative achievement. IS At the height of this
Washington protest, Senator Robert Dole
(R-Kansas) sponsored and, through the intervention of Senate Agriculture Committee
Chairman Herman Talmadge (D-Georgia) in
amending a House-passed raisin marketing
order, secured Senate passage of a flexible
parity plan (H.R. 6782) that was geared to
AAM's demands. 19 All indications, according
to AAM leaders, were that the amendment
had strong support in the House of Representatives, as well. Their feeling-and one expressed often by Washingtonians at that time-was
that Congress could hardly turn them down
with the proposal so far advanced and the
protest at its peak. However, President Carter
and his administration worked hard to defeat
the bill on both budgetary grounds and the
issue of food price inflation. Consequently, a
House-Senate conference committee version
failed to secure House passage. That bill
subsequently went back to conference and the
Emergency Assistance Act of 1978 was rereported as a very different measure, an
authorization for price support readjustments
at USDA Secretary Bergland's discretion. The
readjustment measure passed both houses, was
signed by the president on 15 May, and led to
an approximate eleven percent increase in
supports. Although the measure would not
have been considered in the absence of AAM's
new prominence, organization leaders took it
as a congressional sellout and an example of
presidential backstabbing. Rather than view it
as a product of political compromise negotiated between many bargainers, the leaders
"knew we were sold out. It was a setup from
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day one!"20
The strike, meanwhile, was so financially
costly for already economically strapped farmers that few could participate. Most of those
protestors who elected to come to Washington
went home early to plant or make arrangements to do so. By late winter, protest leaders
quietly began to call for ten percent production cutbacks among the Movement's activists
as a symbolic show of support. Of the forty-nine leaders who were asked if they cut back
production for strike-related reasons in 1979,
only ten (or twenty percent) responded affirmatively.2I For AAM followers, the numbers
surely were far less, as all Economics, Statistics,
and Cooperative Service documents of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture showed continued increased production from 1977 to
1978. In short, the strike had absolutely no
effect on food and fiber production.
AAM leaders were less disturbed with the
failure of the strike than with the weakened
emergency farm bill. The strike was explained
away as an action that everyone wanted to
avert and that Congress, through its delaying
action, was able to subvert. Farmers, they
noted, had to arrange financing and buy
planting materials far in advance of 15 May.
Few leaders really expected it to be a successful
withholding action anyway, it appears. Fewer
than half of the respondents in the leadership
survey believed that a strike could succeed if
organized; and only one-half who felt that it
could work if organized actually believed that
it could get underway. These responses seem to
suggest why the strike and its failure were
forgotten by AAM as the organization placed
a renewed emphasis on protest for the remainder of 1978.
AAM efforts did not diminish after the
flexible parity bill was dismantled in Congress.
Although what eventually was to be a high
degree of desertions among both activists and
rank and file began in the spring of 1978,
AAM's levels of activity and visibility remained high. The leaders and their remaining
supporters continued and accelerated past
tactics. They emphasized the development of

plans for a larger national protest, expanded
local organizations and protest, and exerted
more national influence on organizational
events.
Alternatives were only briefly considered
for two reasons. Most leaders sincerely believed that AAM had almost succeeded legislatively solely by focusing so much public and
political attention on itself. AAM activists
continuously spoke of the leader who voiced
the opinion that "the squeaking wheel gets the
grease."22 Blacks and university students were
pointed to as examples of those who had
succeeded in this way. Politics as a more subtle
process of negotiation and compromise was
not defined in the AAM dictionary. As a
result, those who remained with AAM were
angry and frustrated with Washington politicians and agreed with the leader who said,
"Next time, more of the same. More and
better." They believed it when they said, "We
can shut Washington down."23
The other reason for not deviating from
AAM's ongoing strategy was simply that of
sunk costs, in the phrase favored by economists. Those responsible for AAM had invested their available resources in order to
organize a Colorado office, state organizations,
locals, and a protest style. With its meager
financial base and dependence upon volunteers, AAM could not afford to reverse itself
and invest in new offices and tactics. In
addition, supporters of AAM had their own
sunk costs relative to their involvement in the
rhetoric and unyielding demands of the
Movement. Any attempt to change directions
could potentially cost AAM its hardestworking followers.
As a result, AAM changed mostly by
degrees during the second half of 1978. Headquarters stepped up communications with the
states and locals. The highly critical American
Agriculture News was regularly published and
distributed. And, at least partially because of
these messages, the ideology of AAM became
more sharply focused and evident. It no longer
extolled agrarian values. The anger of early
1978 was directed at the previously chastened
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corporations; banking interests and internationalists were added to the list of enemies now
portrayed as the primary reason for AAM's
legislative defeat.
The second Washington tractorcade, occurring in January 1979, must be understood
in the context of escalating anger, more
extreme interpretations of economic conditions, and the increasing difficulty of gaining
media attention. More moderate farmers,
including many from the earliest stages of
AAM protest, continued to leave the ranks as
charges became more harsh and less politically
acceptable to them. This desertion produced a
longer tractorcade of nearly nine hundred
vehicles but an actual turnout of only half as
many farmers, although their ranks did grow.
It also produced a group without many of the
calming voices that earlier had urged temperate behavior. The second tractorcade, unlike
the first, refused to park peacefully at a local
stadium upon its arrival. Protestors immediately and frequently tied up traffic, blocked
intersections, and damaged federal facilities.
Finally, the police successfully confined them
to the Mall.
This time Washington did not open its
doors. AAM found most legislators unavailable except for the briefest discussions. No
ranking administration officials made protestors feel at home. In retaliation, many farmers
became belligerent and threatening, which
further isolated them from their targets. By
midwinter, with most television networks and
newspapers criticizing their personal behavior
and ignoring their political complaints, most
AAM protestors left town despite their earlier
threats to stay until spring.
This disastrous turn in AAM's public
relations marked a dramatic shift in organizational behavior. AAM was, by February 1979,
everyone's subject of criticism; and it had lost
even more supporters from its own ranks. Its
behavior was labeled a disgrace by the media,
Congress, USDA, other agricultural groups,
consumer groups, and many who had helped
found it. Despite whatever sunk costs remained among the closing locals and disap-

pearing state organizations, the group had no
option other than a sharp change in political
tactics.
The rest of 1979 was devoted to keeping
AAM afloat. Although some local and state
protests continued, the few remaining diehards
could not generate support for a return to
Washington and a third protest tractorcade
died in planning. During this period, all locals
in twelve states were closed. In the remaining
twenty-eight, delegates at the June 1979 AAM
convention estimated that between sixty and
ninety percent of their state locals were totally
inactive. AAM was most evident through its
News.
AAM kept functioning by keeping likeminded farmers informed and by invoking
memories of how smoothly the organizational
aspects of the strike had come together. A
small Washington office with a single paid
lobbyist was established. The protestors who
remained in Washington or returned throughout 1979 worked to develop an image of
continuous political involvement. They coordinated their activities through that office and
attempted to work with as many congressional
staffs and USDA bureaus as possible. As part
of that new strategy, the tractorcade scheduled
for February 1980 was replaced by a series of
informational demonstrations, including several distilleries for producing gasohol, which
was proposed as a solution to the nation's
energy problems. These activists assumed more
of the informational role that political scientists have observed to be typical of lobbies,
although they did arouse some threats by
emphasizing that AAM would become active
elector ally in the future. z4
Within the organization, support and turnout continued to lag. The June convention
had been seen as a time and place for
formalizing the organization. The leadership
presented a plan that they hoped would lend
even greater structure to AAM while strengthening the commitment and support of its very
fluid membership. The delegates found proposals for formal membership, dues, a strengthened Washington office, and bylaws
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unacceptable because such innovations were
ill-timed and inappropriate while AAM lacked
an existing base of support. The delegates
approved a loose organizational structure that
designated formal leaders-a national chair,
vice chair, secretary, and treasurer-to foster
growth and purpose for the Movement. This
action also passed on a governing national
body of the designated state delegates whose
status had been approved a year earlier.
The second 1979 convention in November
elected Marvin Meek, a cotton farmer from
the Texas panhandle and an early AAM
activist, as AAM's first chair. At this point,
AAM also possessed twenty-eight state delegations, parity as its political goal, a still
organized headquarters, a small Washington
office, a few thousand subscribers to American
Agricultural News, and an almost completely
inactive system of locals. It had emerged to
strike, had wielded a formidable and well-organized protest, and had lost momentum as its
protest met with public disfavor. The remaining leadership sought to continue as a viable
farm interest and voice by regaining that
momentum. Although AAM went on to stage
some protests, its leaders never captured what
they lost despite vigorous campaign work,
attempts to take control of other farm groups,
and continued national lobbying. 25
AAM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Much about this surge and decline in the
organizational fortunes. of AAM parallels the
history of earlier American farm groups. Two
political scientists who have formulated contemporary theories of interest groups provide
some generalized insights into what links
AAM to the past. Robert H. Salisbury, who in
fact developed many of his ideas from observations about agricultural groups, discusses
interest groups in terms of entrepreneurs and
the creation of membership benefits. 26 Entrepreneurs are organizational founders who
build a group structure and then generate a
following. That following commits itself to
some form of low- to high-cost group membership in exchange for specific benefits offered

by the entrepreneurs. These benefits may be of
many different types, but all are important in
that they can be gained only· through group
participation.
Jack L. Walker, on the other hand, finds
that new groups can hardly be successful
without what he identifies as their patrons of
political action. 27 If the patrons-who may be
some form of mass membership-are in no
mood or position to support the group, no
amount of entrepreneurship will succeed. For
this reason, new interest groups are most likely
to emerge in times of social upheaval, when an
investment in a particular group seems most
worthwhile. 28
For agricultural protest groups with a
general interest in farm conditions rather than
in specific product or commodity gains, this
conceptual framework specifies several factors
generally important to group emergence. 29
These groups usually are organized during
periods when farm prices are comparatively
low. Thus, farmers perceive an upheaval
relative to their own prior situations. In times
such as these, entrepreneurs who have been
active in the farm community become the
major catalyst for organizing by selling discontented farmer patrons on the need for group
action. The ongoing political order, but particularly institutions that directly gain from the
farm economy, becomes identified as not only
the cause of farm problems but also as the
source of solutions. Although some organizations seek to address these problems through
cooperative purchasing and sales arrangements
and others do so by emphasizing strong social
ties among themselves, all share some sort of a
protest orientation directed toward a positive
political reaction. That is, they all want
material rewards for their members and pursue
them through strategies that separate the
groups from the political mainstream. Furthermore, each organization or movement develops or acquires a supportive ideology to
differentiate their version of a stronger agrarian lifestyle from that of the rest of society. It
seems true, as Don Hadwiger once observed of
farmers in politics, that these organizations
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emerge in crusades of dramatic change because
their members do not feel part of the political
system, being so far removed from the centers
of politics and the stimuli produced there. 30
The American Agriculture Movement
emerged in reaction to a farm policy that,
through the 1973 farm bill, had created
fencerow-to-fencerow production following a
period of high farm prices. Policymakers had
hoped to encourage production in order to tap
international markets-which, unfortunately,
proved to be unstable and did not continue to
expand with U.S. farm efforts. Thus, as supply
increased, demand decreased and prices
dragged. The importance of this price decline
was exaggerated because inflation in the general economy was pushing up both annual costs
of production and interest rates. For some
farmers, increasing interest rates were unusually troublesome because of recent land and
equipment purchases they had made to step up

personal production. When no corrective
action was proposed as part of the 1978 farm
bill, farmers were indeed left at an extremely
low economic point. 31
Similar conditions plagued the earliest farm
organizers and inspired their protests. The
earliest large-scale farm organization, the
Grange, began in 1870 during a period of U.S.
agricultural expansion at the conclusion of the
Civil War. High war prices gave way in the
face of production increases and by 1878, as
the Grange grew, corn prices had steadily
declined thirty-two percent from 1866. This
period also spawned agrarian participation in
the Greenback Party and the Free Silver
movement after they had spread from urban
centers. As they would be in 1978, agrarian
protestors were disenchanted by federal legislation in 1878, when the touted Bland-Allison
Act failed to appreciably expand the money
supply despite the coinage of silverY

FIG. 1. Tractors at Capitol after tractorcade 5 February 1979, about 2 PM, while police were busy
boxing them in and farmers were listening to speeches and unaware of what was happening. The sign .
on the left hand side of the right foreground tractor reads "DOGING IT TO WASHINGTON,"
while the sign on back reads "With Prices and Tails Cut WE ARE STILL WAGGING." Photo by
J. Fetterolf, courtesy of American Agriculturist.
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The National Farmers Alliance (NFA)
emerged out of these conditions as well. Its
base, however, was the yeoman farmer of the
South who, more than his northern neighbors, lived in economic, political, and social
dependency. The average farmer relied on
credit to finance future crops. Eventually,
because of continuing low prices, many southern farmers were so deeply in debt that they
lacked hope for ever being cleared. The Texas
Alliance, Louisiana Farmers' Union, and
Agricultural Wheel-the three arms of NFA's
1888 merger-all originated in that context. 33
The early twentieth century saw three new
farm organizations develop: the National
Farmers Union (NFU) and American Society
of Equity in 1902 and the Nonpartisan League
in 1914. The NFU was built on the ruins of the
Alliance in Texas while Equity began in
Indiana. Farmers in neither movement faced
historically low prices during this period of
relatively sustained agricultural prosperity.34
They, however, still experienced at least minor
swings in the market place and remembered
the major ones. Organizational momentum
was provided by fear of lower cotton prices for
the NFU and, in the case of Equity, by an
avoidance of what farmers saw as continuing
violent price fluctuations. The League, with its
North Dakota origins, began after a dry season
combined with lower prices to drive some
farmers out of business. Arthur C. Townley,
the founder of the Nonpartisans, had expanded during the good years of 1910-1911 and was
financially vulnerable to severe losses for
which he would not take blame as profits
dropped in 1912.35 The Farmers Holiday
Association was the only major protest group
spawned during the Great Depression and it
was largely ad hoc in nature. 36
The last general agrarian protest prior to
AAM's emergence was in 1955 as prices fell
after the Korean War. The National Farmers
Organization (NFO) , also Iowa-based, emphasized collective bargaining during a period
that saw a ten-year decline in the price index of
eleven percent, accompanied by a seventeen
percent increase in the costs. of services and

goods for farmers. 37 They had more success
than all farm organizations but the Grange
and NFU in developing a lasting organization.
But the routes to success and failure were
similarly tumultuous for each of these organizations.
Entrepreneurship characterized these
groups just as it did AAM. Without what
Saloutos and Hicks identified as "gifted farm
organizers," many of them never would have
existed. 38 In other instances, entrepreneurs
were only interested in their own initial
groups. Oliver Hudson Kelley of the Grange
and the NFU's Newton Gresham left government and newspaper careers to organize while
living off credit and neighborly largess. Milo
Reno, a preacher and NFU worker, coordinated and symbolized the Farmers Holiday
protests. Arthur C. Townley, a professional
organizer with a history of work in radical
causes, organized the Nonpartisan League
using "high pressure salesmanship." Although
these and most other dominant leaders worked
with activists who also played important roles
in organizing, Equity was totally centered in
the hands of publisher James A. Everitt. The
NFO originated in a similar fashion with Iowa
feed salesman Jay Loghry but was taken over
by the charismatic Oren Lee Staley. The
Farmers Alliance with its merger of groups
owed its organizational successes to a greater
variety of individuals, but the Texas Alliance's
John R. Allen and A. P. Hungate had great
influence, as did professional activists Charles
Macune and S. O. Daws after the union. 39
Within AAM, farmers Darrel Schroeder and
Bud Bitner and elevator operator Van Stafford
were particularly and continuously influential
in articulating the purpose of the protests.
Marvin Meeks's firelike commitment, tremendous dedication to work, and skills at developing strategy won him an early position in
the group's small leadership cadre.
The roles of the entrepreneur in each of
these instances must be understood as critical
to the group's emergence. The fact that
economic times have often been difficult for
farmers, yet protests and groups did not come
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together, demonstrates the organizer's importance as a catalyst. Given the potential for new
groups to emerge, there have been surprisingly
few. As Kohl has so succinctly stated, "Farmers do not rebel as an instinctive response."40
The social benefits of agrarian fraternity
and just plain friendship facilitated many of
the organizational attempts, including AAM's;
and solidarity benefits have certainly been
important for group maintenance, especially
for the Grange. But it must be noted that each
group sought political satisfaction for their
members' problems during these particularly
bad economic times.
The growth years of the Grange began in
1872-73 as Kelley focused on securing cheaper
transportation from what farmers perceived as
repressive railroads. 41 Interestingly, the Grange
grew most rapidly during that period in
regions of greatest economic distress. The
Alliance also was most successful when most
politicized. They used the "too slow" Grange
as a foil to claim that the Alliance was more
militant, cooperative, and successful. When
NFU came forward from the ranks of the
defunct Alliance, it did so as an anticapitalist
effort to build counter institutions for marketing cotton. NFU aimed to succeed by holding
cotton off the market. Equity, at the same time
but under the guidance of an entrepreneur
with free market rather than socialist values,
was also organizing to withhold. Everitt,
however, wanted farmers to emulate big trusts
and gain control of the market through such
an actionY
The Nonpartisan League was the most
overtly political of the farm groups, aiming to
take over state government and elect a percentage of representatives equal to a state's
percentage of farmers. By 1918, they had
captured the governorship and control of both
legislative houses in North Dakota. Despite
these successes and the permanence of Minnesota's Democratic Farm-Labor Party, the difficulties of maintaining an electoral coalition
proved disadvantageous to the League's existence. Both the Farm Bureau and Farmers
Union drew away its membership base in the

early 1920s with their emphasis on membership services. 43 During economic good
times, politics appeared too time-consuming
for busy farmers. At least that was the lesson
farm organizers seemed to learn because the
Farm Holiday, NFO, and AAM all mobilized
later around threats of withholding and collective action. The lack of interest in permanent
political control by farm movement organizers
should not be surprising. Farming has always
been an all-encompassing enterprise and, as
AAM's attempt indicates, most of its practitioners have neither the time nor inclination
to become deeply enmeshed in governmental
activity. As a result, farmers can be organized
around a plan or an idea, but their continued
commitment is unlikely.
The Grange began a decline by 1875. The
Alliance was dead by the turn of the century.
Equity's protest activity lasted eight years. The
Farmers Holiday Association went into eclipse
in four. The strike activity ofNFO was evident
sporadically over a period of years and then
peaked in 1962. Even the NFU, which survives
with the greatest degree of political presence
and largest membership of any general farm
group except the Farm Bureau, put member
activism aside and by 1910 had settled into
organizational routines of cooperative, social,
and educational activities. 44
Entrepreneurs, in order to organize successfully, must know their markets, or what
appeals to potential patrons. The history of
farm group organizing indicates that farmers
find appealing the quick fix with its emphasis
on dramatic protest and a comforting ideology. Protests, as visible demonstrations against
those who are seen responsible for the farmers'
plight, have been characteristic of these
groups. AAM indiscretions during these actions seem remarkably tame and free of
violence compared to those of many preceeding groups.
Tobacco farmers associated with Equity
used night riders who set fires, sabotaged the
tobacco trust, and dynamited its machinery.
NFU night riders also served as enforcers, in
this case attempting to insure participation in
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the 1908 "plow up" campaign. The Farmers
Holiday directed violence at nonparticipating
farmers and blocked roads to disrupt marketing. NFO withholding was accompanied by
shootings. Even the recurrent counter marketing institutions were primarily protests against
dominant middleman interests and those in
politics who countenanced themY In all these
instances, farm groups viewed protests as
instrumental to obtaining capitulation and
cooperation from those who opposed their
interests. As political outsiders without bargaining power, they used the protest to demonstrate farm power to the targets and, to at
least some degree, to the subjects who were
being recruited and mobilized. American farmers always appear to have needed a forceful
and reassuring display of their own ability to
matter. They have had little time for anything
else.
Farmers, however, have needed more in
order to be reassured. Consistently, ideology
has been used to reach farm supporters and
back up displays of force. AAM's rhetoric
glorified the family farm, agrarian virtues, and
the economic contribution of agriculturalists
as producers and consumers. It also criticized
politics, farm groups, and the public for being
inattentive to farm needs and, thus, responsible for low farm prices. 46 In 1977 and through
mid-I978 this justified AAM's strategy, but as
AAM demands were turned away in 1978 and
as attacks on the organization and its political
style intensified in 1979, group leaders developed the enemies of agriculture argument
much further. A hard and fast ideology-or
perhaps a second-stage ideology-developed
quickly. High costs, which had always been
advanced as a reason for increasing prices,
were blamed on a corporate conspiracy rather
than on the conditions of the economy Y The
"corporates" increasingly were portrayed as
having ruined that economy through their
monopolistic handling of agricultural products. They did so in league with bankers and
other international interests who, as "master
swindlers," controlled all facets of society
including agricultural and economic research

that might otherwise have proposed solutions.
Moreover, these enemies created a moral crisis
in the nation by advancing their interests
through welfare economics, propaganda, and
the victimization of all working Americans. 48
While this broad set of beliefs might not
have been entirely accepted by AAM's supporters, and indeed was not generally accepted
by its activists, it was important nonetheless. 49
With it, during mobilization, AAM possessed
a general explanation for its existence and
protest strategy. As losses mounted, the ideology hardened and was used to encourage the
hardliners who still fought for AAM's existence.
Ideology has been similarly useful for other
farm groups, and there is certainly very little
new about AAM's rhetoric. The idealization
of farm life and its contrasts to the rest of
society were integral to populism, the Grange,
groups of the Alliance, NFU, the Farmers
Holiday, and NFO. The Free Silver and
Greenback movements and the Nonpartisan
League provided economic arguments compatible with AAM's fears of farmer repression.
The Alliance, NFU, Farmers Holiday, NFO,
and to some extent Equity all mounted attacks
on the monopolies that were seen as victimizing farmers. Even the rhetoric of Granger
attacks on the railroads and calls for cooperatives were similar. Moreover, most of these
groups shifted, like AAM, from agrarian
idealism to more radical criticism. As the
organizations began to decline and lose supporters, ideologies became more pronounced
and more critical of the institutions that
farmers depended upon-an example of the
way ideology traditionally has been used for
entrepreneurial purposes in structuring farm
protests against low prices.
FARM PROTEST IN

A MODERN SOCIETY

If the American Agriculture Movement has
been much like its predecessors in farm politics,
it has also benefited and suffered as a result of
conditions found only in modern society and its
technology. The electronic media most impor-
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tantly, modern transportation, and other innovations in communications made AAM possible
as a rapidly emerging national protest group.
These had been unavailable even twenty-three
years earlier to the NFO, although that organization did gain extensive midwest newspaper
coverage.
The technology and-AAM's skillful use of it
allowed the organization to develop a national
image, reputation, and support group that no
other farm protest group had ever possessed. At
the onset, local protestors brought in farmers
from other states and regions. When organizing
locals, AAM emphasized their broad dispersement and sent. its own leadership around the
county as facilitators. By becoming a nationally
recognized interest and moving its protest to the
midst of political decision-making in Washington, AAM developed its bargaining power as
politicians countrywide sought out its
spokesmen. AAM also established an ongoing
communications system linking its headquarters
with the locals. Telephones, printing operations,
and rapid mail delivery enabled messages to be
disseminated quickly and on a large scale. This
resulted in well-coordinated rallies and allowed
the organizers to continue to prod reluctant
locals. As a result, AAM's grass roots involvement was most impressive and added futher to
its credibility.
AAM's most important decision, however,
was to rely on the media, especially television, to
advertise its activities. AAM was able to reach
all potential targets: the public, politicians, and
likely farm supporters. To gain that coverage,
AAM was creative' enough to emphasize its
flamboyance. Releasing goats on the Capitol
grounds, harrassing a West German consul,
throwing tomatoes at Secretary Bergland, and
similar incidents all became important for their
news appeal. As Marvin Meek was quoted as
saying, "We may be stupid but at least we're
smart enough not to buy TV time."so The
media's coverage was the cornerstone of the
American Agricultural Movement. Without it,
AAM could not have spread its message of hard
times, protest, and the value of farming so
quickly or so efficiently. The national uprising

caught everyone but AAM's own activists offguard and created a look of spontaneity that few
interest groups have had. In addition, AAM
initially possessed few financial or manpower
resources and could hardly have organized in
any other way.
Although modern technology and AAM's
brand of marketing served the organization well
during its emergence, it also became a negative
factor. News representatives were less eager to
get involved as AAM events became routine.
This led to a continued escalation of the
protests. Combined with the anger and frustration accompanying the second Washington
tractorcade, this escalation proved a disaster.
Media coverage and public opinion became
especially critical of AAM, and a positive image
proved to be impossible to recreate. As a result,
by the time AAM became most critical of
political and economic events, there was no one
left to report or to listen.
The American Agriculture Movement
played a short but central role in the politics of
U.S. agriculture. It did so by behaving much like
those few other protest groups who have
appeared locally over the past 110 years. But its
organizational successes were very different from
those of preceding groups because of AAM's
ability to achieve a national following. The use
of modern technology allowed AAM to reach
both farmers and the public to a truly extraordinary degree, but the organization's mobilization
did little to ensure its future. In this respect,
AAM suffers the fate of those various other farm
organizations that have either died or gone
through periods of very poor health.
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